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KANT, HUSSERL, MCDOWELL: 
THE NON-CONCEPTUAL IN EXPERIENCE 
– Corijn van Mazijk –
Abstract. In this paper I analyze some important contemporary criticisms of McDowell´s concep-
tualism by Kant and Husserl scholars. Many Kant scholars have recently taken a stance against 
McDowell´s reading of Kant in Mind and World, arguing that Kant’s account involves 
non-conceptual content. At the same time, phenomenologists such as Dreyfus [2013] have drawn 
on first person descriptions of skillful coping to support non-conceptual content, while Hopp 
[2010, 2011] bases himself on Husserl’s early theory of fulfillment in Logical Investigations to reject 
conceptualism. I will show for each of these Kantian and phenomenological theories that although 
they point to something significant, they fail to trouble McDowell’s conceptualism. I then turn to 
Barber’s [2008] and Mooney’s [2010] conceptualist readings of the later Husserl. Against them, 
I will argue that Husserl’s late phenomenology does make room for a kind of non-conceptual con-
tent inconceivable from Kant’s or McDowell’s viewpoint, but also that this need not contradict 
McDowell’s conceptualism. 
Keywords: McDowell, Husserl, Non-Conceptual Content, Phenomenology, Kant, Conceptualism, 
Passive Synthesis. 
1. Introduction
Recently, discussions on non-conceptual content in Edmund Husserl′s phe-
nomenology have seen a revival. This seems due partially to the work of John 
McDowell on the role of sense perception in experience. In his already classic 
work Mind and World (1994), McDowell advocates a conceptualist reading of Kant1 
according to which there can be no non-conceptual mental states. Those against 
conceptualism mostly agree that there are at least “some mental states [that] can 
represent the world even though the bearer of those states does not possess the 
concepts required to specify their content”.2 Conceptualists like McDowell, how-
1 References to the Critique of Pure Reason are given abbreviated in parentheses in the text [CPR], 
following standard practice of ‘A’ and ‘B’ referring to the first and second edititions. Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, ed. nnd trans. P. Guyer and A Wood, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, New 
York, Melbourne 1998. 
2 Bermúdez [2003] p. 1. 
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ever, think that this line of thought inevitably results in what Wilfrid Sellars [1963] 
famously dubbed the “myth of the given”. For that which cannot be conceptually 
apprehended must in all ways escape the bounds of thought and is therefore, as 
Kant so diversely put it, “blind”,3 “as good as nothing for us”,4 or “less than 
a dream”.5 Therefore, McDowell asserts that the very idea of non-conceptual sense 
data which somehow affect our beliefs while at the same time offering a foothold 
in external reality must be avoided. But it seems the only alternative is 
a coherentism according to which thought does not touch upon the world and be-
liefs are justified by other beliefs only. Such a coherentism, at least on McDowell’s 
understanding, renders the whole idea of experience impossible. The solution he 
then proposes takes form as a conceptualist reading of Kant which is supposed to 
save thought′s bearing on external reality without invoking any kind of 
non-conceptual content that would be prone to the given. 
In this paper I compare McDowell′s conceptualism to Husserl′s early and 
late phenomenology and recent interpretations of both. I start out by discussing 
McDowell′s conceptualist reading of Kant and some of the criticisms it has 
received from Kant scholars. I will argue that their cases for Kantian 
non-conceptualism fail to rebut McDowell’s conceptualist reading. I will then look 
at Hopp’s [2010, 2011] phenomenological critique of McDowell, which he bases on 
the phenomenology of the early Husserl, and show why his arguments similarly 
have little bearing on McDowell’s conceptualism. Thirdly, I discuss Barber’s [2008] 
and Mooney’s [2010] interpretations of Husserl’s later work, who assert that the 
later Husserl and McDowell are in fundamental agreement. I will argue that their 
position is correct but for the wrong reasons. Contrary to their interpretations, 
I will show that Husserl’s focus on passive synthesis allows him to move beyond 
experience in the Kantian and McDowellean sense, which demands the role of 
concepts in any synthesis, toward wholly passive syntheses which operate freely 
from the rule of the understanding, and which are therefore non-conceptual. This 
position is, I argue, inconceivable from the standpoint of Kant′s transcendental 
philosophy, since in the latter both transcendental apperception and the categories 
are taken to be involved in the lowest syntheses, even that of perception.6 Alt-
hough this makes sufficient room for non-conceptual content in Husserl’s later 
                                                 
3 CPR A51/B75. 
4 CPR A111. 
5 CPR A112. 
6 CPR B161. 
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philosophy, I will argue that it need not be incompatible with McDowell’s concep-
tualism after all. 
2. McDowell′s Kantianism 
The topics on which McDowell [1994, 2009, 2013] and many others with 
him recently embark broadly concern the epistemological role of the senses in the 
structure of our experience and the relation between it and higher level acts of 
consciousness. To talk about senses and experience, however, is already to use 
highly ambivalent terms. In Kant′s day and age, science and philosophy had less 
to do with psychological or phenomenological descriptions of passive perception 
or sensory episodes of consciousness then it does today. For Kant′s purposes, 
a theory of experience had primarily if not only to incorporate those elements re-
quired for mathematical calculations, the description of natural laws, and the lim-
its and transgressions of both.7 As is well known, these interests led him to define 
experience [Erfahrung] in a way that is much more narrow than is ours today: it 
refers only to that part of our worldly sense-making relevant to the possibility of 
scientific progression, which in turn is conditioned by a priori intuitions and the 
categories of the understanding. Experience, for Kant, is a synthesis of an intuition 
with a concept of which knowledge is the end product. 
It is not immediately obvious where we should locate the role of the senses 
in this Kantian picture of experience. McDowell favors an interpretation of Kant in 
which the term intuition points to the representations provided by sensible expe-
rience, whereas sensations considered on their own are abstractions. If we were to 
call any of the constituents of experience blind, then, it would have to be the sens-
es and the sensations [Empfindungen] they supply, but only if we render them in 
an abstract isolation unfaithful to experience. This way, sensations (but not intui-
tions) are deprived of any epistemological function and by consequence McDowell 
has excluded one important candidate for the myth of the given. It is in this re-
spect that McDowell departs most from Sellars [1963], who is slightly more favor-
able of sensations. 
Having deprived the senses of the function Kant provided them with in af-
fording intuitions, McDowell still needs to reconsider the meaning of intuition in 
order not to let it fall prey to the myth of the given. McDowell therefore asserts 
                                                 
7 This division is reflected in the threefold structure of the Prolegomena: how is pure mathematics 
possible? How is pure natural science possible? And: how is metaphysics in general possible? The 
first corresponds roughly to the transcendental aesthetic, the second to the analytic, and the third 
to the dialectic. 
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that what happens in perception is an “opportunity for judging”.8 This means 
firstly that perceptual experience provides representations which form opportuni-
ties for discursive acts. But in a second and more profound sense, it means that 
these perceptual representations are already informed by conceptual activity, re-
gardless of whether a stance of judgment is taken. For McDowell, in any percep-
tion, the relevant conceptual capacities that could be put into play upon a discur-
sive apprehension of the represented object are already drawn upon. McDowell 
has been ambiguous as to whether the content of a perception is different at all 
from that of a concept. In Mind and World, he writes “that things are thus and so is 
the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment […] So it 
[perceptual experience] is conceptual content”.9 But it is not McDowell’s intention 
to argue that, as some critics have assumed, that the involvement of concepts in 
perception implies a distance between the subject of the experience and the object 
he or she intentionally relates to.10 For McDowell, the merely perceiving or skill-
fully coping subject does not actively engage in conceptual activity.11 Rather, the 
idea is that such acts are passively informed by concepts, that is, without having to 
objectify the content as one does in making a propositional judgment. To see a cup 
of coffee on one’s desk as well as to skillfully drink from it are acts that are “sad-
dled” with conceptual capacities, which is to say that they are essentially reliant 
on conceptual capacities in a sense that does not distort their specific phenome-
nology. That this is so is then explained by adherence to the process of Bildung or 
cultural development in which human beings engage from their birth onwards.  
McDowell’s conceptualist reading of Kant has stimulated plenty new 
debates over Kantian conceptualism.12 Those who, against McDowell, favor 
a non-conceptualist reading of Kant, often draw on those fragments of the Critique 
where Kant seems to suppose that intuition can present objects without concepts 
being in play. These are three of them: 
Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to the 
functions of the understanding. (A89/B122) 
                                                 
8 See also: McDowell [2013a]. 
9 McDowell [1994] p. 26. 
10 See for instance: Dreyfus [2013]; Schear [2013]. 
11 McDowell [2013b] pp. 41–46. 
12 See for instance: Hanna [2008, 2011a, 2011b]; Ginsborg [2008]; Watkins [2008]; Allais [2009]; Grif-
fith [2010]; Grüne [2009, 2011, 2013]; De Sá Pereira [2013]; Gomes [2014]. 
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Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no 
means requires the functions of thinking. (A90/B123) 
The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensi-
ble, i.e., nothing but receptivity. (B129–B130) 
An additional often heard counter argument is that Kant′s claims on the constitu-
tive role of the understanding for experience are closely tied to his objective notion 
of experience which does not match ours today. As for instance Hanna [2008] and 
de Sá Pereira (2013) point out, the relevant passages from the Critique which 
indicate the indispensable role of the understanding for experience could be inter-
preted relative to objective experience or knowledge rather than as pertaining to 
experience in our contemporary sense. The third and, to my view, most important 
argument against McDowell’s conceptual reading of Kant comes from Hanna’s 
interpretation of Kant’s pre-critical works. In brief, Hanna [2008] believes that it is 
essential to Kant’s early position with regard to debates on space that there is an 
element to experience that is not conceptual. The reason for this is that Kant 
thought it impossible to conceptually differentiate two objects that are each other’s 
mirror image.13 Thus, in an imagined space with a left and a right hand in it that 
are otherwise identical, no conceptualist could ever mathematically assert the dif-
ference that humans obviously would experience on an encounter with both 
hands. This problem, addressed by Hanna as the “Two-Hands Argument” led 
Kant to see that there has to be a non-conceptual element to our experience of 
space and time. In the Critique, this would be called pure intuition. Later, in What 
Does It Mean To Orient Oneself In Thinking?, Kant would also refer to it as a sense of 
orientation. 
These three criticisms pose problems for McDowell’s conceptualism both 
for itself and as an interpretation of Kant. I believe, however, that McDowell’s 
reading of Kant can be defended against the three main criticisms just outlined. 
Firstly, the fragments drawn on by non-conceptualists do not as such make a case 
for non-conceptualism, given that the Critique contains a more or less equal num-
ber of passages that state the opposite. They do not by themselves offer a reason to 
favor these fragments over the others and therefore do not offer unambiguous 
support for non-conceptualism. The second argument for non-conceptualism is 
justly based on the difference between Kant’s concept of experience and ours. If 
we look at the B-Deduction, we find Kant arguing for the transcendental necessity 
of the categories for all experience. So far, the ambiguity might obtain. However, 
                                                 
13 See Kant [2003]. 
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a bit later on,14 in what is sometimes referred to as the second step of the 
B-Deduction15, Kant makes it clear that he wants the categories to play their part in 
all possible perception as well: 
Consequently, all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, 
stands under the categories. (CPR B161 – my italics) 
The strong claim contained in this sentence is not brought about by an accidental 
turn of phrase. It is the core of the argumentative structure of the Transcendental 
Deduction. Kant believes that only this way the transcendental use of the catego-
ries for all experience can be maintained. Consequently, the attempt to reduce 
Kant’s conceptualism to a theory of knowledge in order to make room for 
a non-conceptualist reading of simple perception, as so many scholars have at-
tempted, is bound to fail. 
Hanna’s so-called “Two Hands Argument” (Hanna [2008]) drawn from 
Kant’s writings on space shows that Kant throughout his pre-critical as well as his 
critical phase believed experience to contain an element that is intrinsically 
non-conceptual. The argument, the way I see it, is entirely correct, which means 
that non-conceptualism has to be appropriated in any complete Kantian theory of 
perception. Still I do not believe, however, that it should pose a threat for McDow-
ell’s reading. In order to see why, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of 
(non-)conceptual content. On the one hand, for a perceptual content to be concep-
tual could mean it lives up to these two standards: (a) concepts are passively 
drawn upon in perception (conceptually ‘saddled’) and (b) the content is essential-
ly open to conceptualization (‘opportunity for judging’). This is the kind of content 
McDowell is interested in when he argues for conceptualism. It is important to see 
that this reading only includes the intentional or representational content of the 
experience; it is restricted to that which an act of consciousness is about, its objec-
tive content. I will for now call this position general content conceptualism.16 But at 
the same time, any perceptual intentional content could be said to contain “partic-
ularity conditions” or what Husserl calls real (reelles) content. For example, right 
now I might be perceptually related to the cup of coffee on my desk. Although the 
intentional content of my perception does not change during the few seconds I am 
                                                 
14 CPR B160–162. 
15 I interpret the two steps of the B-Deduction as an attempt to justify the validity of the categories 
as a priori synthetic for experience by first showing their necessity and second explaining their uni-
versality, Rauscher [2012] pp. 1–2. 
16 See also Van Mazijk [2014a] for my complete interpretation of Kant’s position on conceptualism. 
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looking at the cup, the exact sense in which it is present is in continuous flux. For 
one, my perspective on the cup changes constantly through the smallest move-
ments of my eyes and body. Given that (i) these particularity conditions are inces-
santly changing and (ii) I am not intentionally related to them but rather to the 
object given through them, it is impossible for me to properly conceptualize them. 
I will call this kind of non-conceptual content real content non-conceptualism. I be-
lieve the non-conceptualism Hanna finds in Kant’s writings on space should be 
taken to match real content non-conceptualism. However, Hanna does not make 
the distinction just made between real and general content conceptualism. There-
fore, he does not see that Kant’s arguments from his earlier works on space can be 
exhausted in terms of real content non-conceptualism while at the same time 
maintaining a conceptualist stance at the level of general content. The same dis-
tinction could also apply to McDowell. For a general content conceptualist like 
McDowell, the particularity conditions alluded to by the real content 
non-conceptualist are irrelevant; they do not constitute reasons for beliefs and 
therefore do not belong to the space of reasons to start with. Consequently, 
McDowell could simply set aside the point made by real content 
non-conceptualists, and the Two Hands Argument thereby fails to make a case 
against McDowell’s general content conceptualist reading of Kant. 
3. The Early Husserl and Non-Conceptual Content 
Phenomenologists are, unlike McDowell, primarily interested in providing 
accurate descriptions of experience. The careful analyses of everyday experiences 
carried out by some of the most influential phenomenologists of the past have led 
a number of contemporary phenomenologists to take a critical stance regarding 
conceptualism. One important phenomenological critique of McDowell comes 
from Hubert Dreyfus, who in the 2013-book The McDowell/Dreyfus-Debate17 turns 
to the phenomenological descriptions of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to argue 
against McDowell’s conceptualism. Dreyfus focuses specifically on descriptions of 
pre-reflective, skillful action. For one, he follows Heidegger that we do not have to 
think about the doorknob on the door in order to use it to enter or leave a room. In 
fact, the doorknob does not have to be apprehended at all. Such ‘absorbed cop-
ings’ are mindless activities; they involve no intentionality, that is, no sub-
ject/object-relation, and therefore, it is claimed, no rationality.18 The conclusion he 
                                                 
17 Schear [2013]. 
18 See also my book review of The McDowell/Dreyfus-Debate for more elaborate discussions on these 
topics: Van Mazijk [2014b]. 
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then draws is that the operations of the understanding are not involved here, and 
hence conceptualism is false. I have already shown in the previous section why 
I believe this argument cannot be held against McDowell. The latter nowhere 
claims that it would be a necessary condition for conceptual content that an inten-
tional distance between subject and object should obtain. Dreyfus, and Schear 
[2013] likewise, miss out on McDowell’s notions of Bildung and “second nature”, 
which point to the fact that human beings can passively employ capacities that be-
long to the understanding, that is, without actively contemplating the relevant 
content involved, and thus without distorting the specific phenomenology of skill-
ful coping of which most of our everyday lives are comprised. Schear and Dreyfus 
leave the entire issue unaddressed whether the pre-reflective action of opening 
a door would have looked the same – or would have been possible at all – without 
passive knowledge of how door knobs work, knowledge of what lies behind the 
door, and knowledge of why I would want to go there. McDowell wants to argue 
that rationality of this kind pervades skillful coping and that these actions are 
therefore a part of the “space of reasons” – which is the key term in McDowell’s 
conceptualism – but Dreyfus´s phenomenological argument does not connect to 
that.19 
Hopp [2010, 2011] provides a different argument for non-conceptual con-
tent based on Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which he similarly directs against 
McDowell. In Perception and Knowledge (2011), Hopp focuses specifically on per-
ceptual content and Husserl’s phenomenological account of “fulfillment”.20 Hopp 
asserts that a perceptual content does not have to be thought about in order to be 
there for me. What’s more, the perception is precisely not thinking and not concep-
tual: it is not thought – which is empty or signitive, as Husserl puts it in Logical 
Investigations – but rather something else, namely something that can epistemically 
fulfill an empty thought. For instance, when I think about a white floor, I intend 
something merely emptily, without the white floor actually being given to me sen-
sibly. If this empty thought of a white floor is now combined with a corresponding 
perceptual givenness of a white floor, then a “synthesis of recognition” takes place 
in which the empty thought is “fulfilled”. Hopp believes that perception must 
have non-conceptual content because it can play this role of epistemic fulfillment 
in a way mere thought cannot. Conceptual thought by itself is empty; perception, 
however, can offer a distinctive surplus, which must therefore be non-conceptual. 
                                                 
19 Note that this also seems to be McDowell’s position in his response to Dreyfus, see McDowell 
[2013b] pp. 41–58. 
20 For a more elaborate discussion of Hopp´s book, see also my review of it: Van Mazijk [2014c]. 
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According to Hopp, the conceptualism of for instance John McDowell 
[1994, 2009] is “utterly incapable of explaining why perceptual experiences play 
this distinctive and privileged role in the production of knowledge”,21 because it 
allegedly overlooks the important role of fulfillment perception plays: 
I can compare my belief that an apple is red with the apple that is red, and when 
I do, I know something I would not have known merely by believing that that ap-
ple is red.22 
The above fragment is an argument for a particular surplus of perception relative 
to thought. Its claim, it seems to me, is convincing. Seeing that an apple is red of-
fers knowledge of a kind I would not have had merely by connecting the ideas 
“apple” and “red” in my head and trying to belief their combination to be actually 
so. However, it is entirely unclear why McDowell would have to disagree with 
this. Conceptualism, as I have shown already, is a thesis about the kind of things 
that can constitute reasons for beliefs. It does not imply denying that intuition is 
something very different from thought in a way that would oppose Husserl's early 
theory of fulfillment. In fact, McDowell knows well that in perception something 
is given while in thought there is not.23 A denial of the specific function of intuition 
in knowledge would rather be a part of the kind of frictionless coherentism 
McDowell is eager to avoid. Hopp is certainly right that when “I come home to 
find my basement flooded, the proposition ‘My basement is flooded’ occurs to me 
because I am presented with my flooded basement”.24 But this is precisely the kind 
of phrase McDowell would hold in support of conceptualism: does the fact that 
I already see a flooded basement and the fact that this can function as a reason for be-
lieving it to be so not by itself indicate that some form of rationality is involved 
already at the level of perception? After all, what I see does not await for me to 
endow it with sense: I see a flooded basement, and because I do, that perception can 
fulfill my thought of it. Even if Hopp does not accept this as sufficient ground to 
speak of conceptual content at the perceptual level, he does appear to agree that 
the perception is a part of the space of reasons – and that is all McDowell is truly 
after. 
Both Dreyfus’s Heidegger-inspired case for non-conceptual content and 
Hopp’s one based on the early Husserlian account of fulfillment present interest-
                                                 
21 Hopp [2011] p. 2. 
22 Hopp [2011] p. 102. 
23 McDowell [2009] p. 263. 
24 Hopp [2010]. 
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ing ways of thinking about non-conceptual content. However, the kind of 
non-conceptual content they argue for have little bearing on McDowell’s concep-
tualism. In the next section, I will consider the phenomenology of the later Husserl 
and some contemporary readings of him that commit to his agreement with 
McDowell. 
4. The Later Husserl and Non-Conceptual Content 
About the last twenty years of his life, Husserl reinvented phenomenology 
by working on what he called passive synthesis: the phenomenological analyses of 
experiences that the subject does not actively participate in, as for instance in skill-
ful coping and visual perception of some kinds. This allowed Husserl to conceive 
of experience as layered; building up from passive sense-makings of which the 
experiencer is unaware to conceptual activities in which he or she actively engag-
es. Roughly speaking, on the basis of his late masterpiece Experience and Judgment, 
three such layers of experience can be distinguished, which are more or less hier-
archically structured: 1. Primary passivity25: the lowest realm of sense-making that 
happens in complete independence of the active subject; 2. Explicative Contempla-
tion: acts of perception which are realized without the subject’s explicit command 
but which are nevertheless consciously experienced in some way by him or her. 
This is, as I take it, the usual case of visual perception; 3. Conceptual activities such 
as judgments of existence which are brought about by the subject.26 
One important transcendental mechanism Husserl thinks governs the low-
est two layers of experience is what he refers to as ‘types’. I shall not here try to 
explain the complex analyses Husserl goes through in order to make that notion 
plausible, but instead restrict myself to what types are said to do.27 Husserl be-
lieves that every time I experience a new kind of object, a new type is automatical-
ly installed through which objects that are similar to it will immediately be appre-
hended as familiar and known.28 For the adult human being, most visual percep-
tion is said to be governed by types. We do not perceive strange, empty forms first 
which we then actively endow with meaning. Rather, perception already presents 
us the object as something that we are familiar with. This does not mean we per-
                                                 
25 Husserl [1997] pp. 64–85. 
26 A fourth layer might be added, called ‘eidetic intuition’, but I omitted it here as it is irrelevant to 
the aims of this paper. 
27 The reader is best advised to read Part I of Husserl’s Experience and Judgment [1997]. 
28 Husserl [1997] pp. 121–124, 149–151. 
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ceive a cup of coffee immediately as being a cup of coffee, which would involve the 
apprehension of concepts and categorial structures. 
For the question of the conceptual saddledness of perception, phenomenol-
ogists may thus turn to Husserl’s notion of type to argue that we never have blind 
intuitions, as McDowell interprets the famous Kantian phrase that ‘intuitions 
without concepts are blind’.29 Therefore, some have argued, intuitions for Husserl 
too have to be conceptually endowed. A second argument for Husserlian concep-
tualism, and the most important one also presented by Husserl scholars Barber 
[2008] and Mooney [2010], is based on a specific interpretation of the relation be-
tween these three different strata of experience. Both claim that Husserl does not 
consider the various layers of experience as truly distinct, from which it would 
follow that primary passivity – the lowest kind of sense-making which involves no 
conscious partaking of the subject – can also never be wholly separated from con-
ceptual activities. Mooney adds to this that primary passivity is something we 
once had to go through but which we have left behind in become adult.30 This 
would mean that the kind of passive synthetic processes Husserl describes as tak-
ing place without us being aware of it are in fact abstractions, for in reality they 
are saddled with concepts much in the way McDowell would have it. If this ar-
gument is sound, as Barber and Mooney believe, then the later Husserl would be 
a conceptualist just like McDowell. 
In what follows, I want to show that these arguments are incorrect, but also 
that Husserl could still be a conceptualist in McDowell’s sense. Let me start with 
taking on the first argument, that the guidance of our everyday perceptions by 
types would come down to tacit use of concepts. Husserl regards the realm of pas-
sive experience as dominated by an interplay of among others bodily movements, 
bodily affections and anticipations which together structure the objects of experi-
ence before the experiencer is aware of it.31 Very often indeed, these passive organ-
izations are guided by earlier conceptual activities through the permanent install-
ment of a so-called type. For instance, I would not have perceived the room I just 
entered as full of computers had I not once learned what computers are through 
conceptual effort. Because I once learned the appropriate concept, I can now simp-
ly see that the room is full of computers without having to actively think that this 
is so. The kind of types involved in this case Husserl also calls a secondary passivi-
                                                 
29 McDowell [1994] pp. 49–65; Kant [1998] A51/B75. 
30 Mooney [2010] pp. 38–43. 
31 Husserl [1997] pp. 71–101. 
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ty.32 In my opinion, this corresponds perfectly to McDowell′s notion of perceptions 
saddled with spontaneity. But the terminology already indicates that there is 
something more. For Husserl’s phenomenology shows that the mechanism of type 
is not in fact reliant on conceptual activity.33 It is also possible to experience new 
objects passively, whether through visual, auditory or tactile perception, and still 
attain a type which will henceforth steer my perceptions of similar formations.34 
For instance, a pre-linguistic infant (or a cat for that matter) does not have to have 
learned the concept “rabbit” in order to have some passive predictions about how 
a rabbit will proceed its way around the garden. This is not to say that the child 
can conceptually calculate or predict where the rabbit will end up. The child’s 
body, however, will be able to produce a response in anticipation to the movement 
of the rabbit when necessary, for instance when the rabbit approaches the child. 
The point here is that the body can passively structure objects in the visual (or oth-
erwise perceived) environment and produce responses to these objects without 
any concepts having been in play at any level. This is an example of types at the 
level of primary passivity: forms of sense-making that are not conceptual or con-
ceptually endowed but nevertheless successfully provide relevant information 
about the environment by way of association with earlier experiences.35 
Unlike McDowell, Husserl has very specific ideas about what counts as 
a concept and what not. He thinks of conceptual activity as a complex act actively 
performed by the subject through which something is intuited that is not itself 
sensibly given. By ´´not itself sensibly given´´ Husserl means that to conceptualize 
the cup of coffee in front of me is to make thematic categorial structures that ob-
tain between the different aspects of the perceptual object and me. For instance, in 
saying ‘this is a cup of coffee’, I judge about the being of the cup, which is not as 
such given to me perceptually, that is, the being does not and cannot figure in re-
ceptive experience. Conceptual judgment therefore involves something that can-
not be receptively constituted. Husserl writes: ‘objectivities of the understanding 
[concepts] can never be originally apprehended in a mere act of reception; they are 
not preconstituted in pure passivity’.36 This is not to deny, as I have just shown, 
that concepts can work their way back into passivity and become a secondary pas-
                                                 
32 Husserl [1997] p. 279. 
33 See also Lohmar [2006] who shares my viewpoint on this. 
34 Husserl [1997] pp. 124–127. 
35 Needless to say, Husserl does not want to say anything about the experiences of infants or cats, 
but these examples help illustrate my point. 
36 Husserl [1997] p. 251 (my italics). 
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sivity. McDowell’s position seems therefore well supported by Husserl’s later 
phenomenology. However, McDowell’s theory demands that intuition is thor-
oughly determined by conceptual capacities. But this is a claim which, taken at 
face value, Husserl´s phenomenology cannot support. For as I have shown, Hus-
serl also has a phenomenology of primary passivity, which is unaffected by con-
cepts, secondary passivity or the subject´s Bildung. Phenomenologically speaking, 
then, primary passivity must be a kind of non-conceptual content, even, it seems, 
on McDowell´s own terms. 
It should be clear that the idea of primary passivity and the notion of 
non-conceptual content I have ascribed to it do not imply an utterly unstructured 
reception of blind intuitions or a commitment to the myth of the given. Husserl 
does not ascribe a basic epistemic role to primary passivity, as in fulfilling the 
foundationalist′s desire for an unmediated apprehension of sensuous content. The 
idea of primary passivity and the phenomenological mechanisms that operate in it 
are only an attempt at phenomenological description of how entirely passive ex-
perience works. 
What I have said thus far should already be sufficient to provide an answer 
to the second argument posited by Barber and Mooney that primary passivity 
would be an abstraction from real experience in which the conceptual is always 
involved. A further argument against their case could, I think, be drawn from the 
general methodical principles of Husserl’s phenomenology. I find it hard to con-
ceive of Husserl’s analyses of passive synthesis as abstractions in the sense Barber 
and Mooney endorse, given that phenomenology cannot analyze that which is not 
immediately and with certainty given upon reflection. If passive synthesis would 
be an abstraction, then it would not be given upon reflection and therefore could 
not be analyzed phenomenologically in the way Husserl wants to analyze it. I find 
Mooney’s additional characterization of these writings as pertaining to something 
that we have left behind in becoming an adult particularly implausible. The reason 
for this is, once more, that the adult phenomenologist cannot analyze the experi-
ences of children nor of himself as a child, for these experiences are not given to 
him immediately upon reflection, as is essential to the phenomenological method. 
In contrast with the kind of non-conceptual content Dreyfus, Schear and 
Hopp argue for, the one I developed on the basis of Husserl's analyses of primary 
passivity does not ignore the specifically passive sense in which McDowell sees 
concepts integrated in experience. Therefore, if Husserl's theory is correct, and it 
plausibly results, as I have suggested, in a kind of content unaffected by concepts 
and the cultural development of the subject, it would appear to present a viable 
alternative to McDowell's conceptualism. However, I do not think that this need 
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be the case. It is useful to recall that McDowell's conceptualism is a theory about 
experience in the light of justification, that is: of what constitutes a reason for 
a belief, i.e. what belongs to the space of reasons and what not. The fact that the 
kind of sense-makings involved in primary passivity are not affected by the con-
ceptual abilities of the subject also establishes that those very same sense-makings 
cannot be a part of the space of reasons. Therefore, Mooney’s and Barber’s conclu-
sions turn out to be right after all that the later Husserl does not contradict 
McDowell's conceptualism. 
6. Conclusion 
As I have shown in the first parts of this paper, McDowell’s conceptualist 
reading of Kant cannot easily be rebutted by reference either to Kant’s pre-critical 
or critical writings. The arguments for Kantian non-conceptualism I discussed are 
the best I know of, but I do not think they are good enough to trouble the concep-
tualist. Hanna's argument from incongruent counterparts can, I have argued, be 
appropriated by distinguishing between Kantian real content non-conceptualism 
and general content conceptualism. McDowell's conceptualist reading of Kant is 
one that focuses on general content conceptualism, that is: on what can figure as 
a reason for believing something to be the case. Because Hanna's argument can be 
made to fit real content non-conceptualism, it fails to touch upon these issues, and 
therefore it cannot trouble McDowell. 
The phenomenological attempts at countering McDowell's conceptualism 
that I have discussed were focused specifically on skillful coping and on the struc-
ture of fulfillment as Husserl presented it in Logical Investigations. Although 
these cases successfully establish interesting phenomenological notions of 
non-conceptual content, I have argued that it is wrong to take them as having 
much bearing on McDowell's conceptualism, for the reason that they do not take 
the specifically passive, habitually sedimentated sense of conceptual activity 
properly into account. 
The later Husserl offers better resources to discuss the conceptuality of ex-
perience in the sense McDowell is after. Contrary to the interpretations offered by 
Barber and Mooney, I have argued that, phenomenologically speaking, primary 
passivity can be interpreted as a stratum of experience filled with non-conceptual 
content, even though this need not contradict the kind of conceptualism McDowell 
proposes. 
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